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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
from a defendant who was unwilling to admit his
guilt."9
Alford also extends the restriction upon Jackson
begun by the Court in Parker v. North Carolina.4'
By ruling that a statute which forces a defendant
to choose between his constitutional rights, his
belief in his innocence, and the possibility of a
harsher penalty is not unduly coercive or "chill-
ing," the Court totally emasculated the Jackson
decision. The fact that a statute may "encourage"
the waiver of constitutional rights is no longer rele-
vant to a determination of whether a plea of guilty
was involuntary or coerced. If a plea is reasonable
in regard to the facts surrounding the defendant's
-case, and competent counsel advised the accused
regarding his plea, the plea is valid and relatively
immune from collateral attack.' Furthermore,
petitioneis asserting the procedural incompetence
of either counsel or judge, or other coercive factors
9 400 U.S. at 40 (Brennan, J., dissenting).40 Although the Court in Brady did not actually over-
rule Jackson, the effect of the decision was to say that
the Jackson result, coercion by fear of a harsher penalty,
was no longer to be considered a factor in determining
the validity of a guilty plea. By expressly rejecting the
constitutional challenge to the statute in Alford, the
Court removed the last hope of any petitioner who
viewed Jackson as grounds for habeas corpus review of
the voluntariness of his plea.4 1 FaD. R. Csmu. P. 11. Since under Rule 11 the trial
court cannot accept a guilty plea without first deter-
mining that it is voluntary, it is very unlikely that a
petitioner could prevail on the assertion that he was
coerced at the time of pleading.
during the proceedings will face a complete record
of their plea.42 It will, therefore, be relatively easy
for a reviewing court to dismiss such petitioners
without a hearing.
Thus, the fact that the Court once held that a
federal statute similar to the one challenged in
Alford had a "'chilling" effect on constitutional
rights, and that a conviction based on a coerced
plea of guilty is a violation of a defendant's right to
due process, has been negated in favor of increased
administrative efficiency for the system of criminal
justice.4s But the constitutional rights waived in a
guilty plea are too important to be sacrificed for a
"rational decision despite coercive factors." In no
event should such rights be waived and a petitioner
denied the right to habeas corpus review simply
because at an earlier time coercive factors made a
plea of guilty seem more "rational."
42 18 U.S.C. § 2255 provides:
Unless the motion and the files and records of the
case conclusively show that the petitioner is en-
titled to no [habeas corpus] relief, the court shall...
grant a hearing....
Faced with a complete record of the voluntariness and
the intelligence of the petitioner's plea, it will be ex-
tremely easy for the reviewing courts to dismiss peti-
tions without granting a hearing.
13 In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135(1968), the Court, quoting from People v. Fisher, 249
N.Y. 419, 432, 164 N.E. 336, 341 (1928), stated:
We secure greater speed, economy, and conven-
ience in the administration of the law at the price
of fundamental principles of constitutional liberty.
That price is too high.
See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479-81(1966); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963).
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Recent years have witnessed an ever increasing
trend toward intervention by federal courts into
state affairs for the purpose of securing the civil
rights of various petitioners.' This trend towbard
federal interventionism can be seen as an out-
'Much of this litigation is due to the wide range of
subjects that have been held by courts to come within
the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
growth of the black struggle for civil rights begun
during the Civil War - and renewed following the
landmark decision of Brown v. Board of Education,'
when several state governments flagrantly violated
the constitutional mandate announced by the
Court in that case.4
2 Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967). Mr. Justice
Brennan, speaking for the Court, discussed duties im-
posed upon the federal judiciary in protecting rights
secured by the Constitution and the Congressional ex-
pansion of federal judicial power in the wave of nation-
alism that dominated political thought following the
Civil War, Id. at 245-48.
3 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4 See Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 499 (1965):
Underlying the Court's major premise that crim-
COMITY
By 1965 the Supreme Court in Dombrowski v.
Pfister5 seemed ready to authorize federal inter-
vention in the previously sacrosanct area of state
criminal proceedings. 6 The petitioners in Dombrow-
ski, officers of a Negro civil rights organization,
sought injunctive and declaratory relief alleging
that Louisiana's Subversive Activities and Com-
munist Control Law7 and Communist Propaganda
Control Laws were facially void for overbreadth
and that threats of enforcement of those statutes
made by various state officers were made without
hope of securing valid convictions, but rather as
part of a plan to harass the petitioners under color
of state law.9
The district court in Dombrowski abstained so as
to allow the state courts the opportunity to nar-
rowly construe statutes which involved the state's
basic right of self preservation. The district court
felt that federal interference with the statute
"would be a massive emasculation of the last
vestige of dignity of sovereignty." 11 The Supreme
Court, in the broadest of language, reversed, hold-
ing that:
Because of the sensitive nature of constitutionally
protected expression, we have not required that all
of those subject to overbroad regulations risk
prosecution to test their rights. For free expression
-of transcendent value to all society, and not
merely to those exercising their rights-might be
the loser."
The Court noted that the "very fact of prosecu-
tion" itself could have an inhibiting effect on first
amendment rights and cause plaintiffs irreparable
injury.1 Since a grand jury had not been convened
and no indictments obtained until after the filing of
the federal action by petitioners, the Court held.
that the federal "anti-injunction" statute, 28
U.S.C. § 228313 was no bar to federal intervention. 4
inal enforcement of an overly broad statute affect-
ing rights of speech and association is in itself a
deterrent to the free exercise thereof seems to be the
unarticulated assumption that state courts will not
be as prone as federal courts to vindicate constitu-
tional rights promptly and effectively.
5380 U.S. 479 (1965).
6 Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943);
Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926).
'LA. REV. STAT. §§ 14:358-14.374, (Cum. Supp.
1962).
9 LA. REV. STAT. §§ 14:390-14:390.8, (Cum. Supp.
1962).
9 See note 1 supra for text of statute under which
relief was sought.
10 380 U.S. at 483.
" Id. at 486.
11 Id. at 487.1328 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964):
Two and one-half years after Dombrowski the
Supreme Court restated their position with even
greater sweep in Zwickler v. Koola.'5 The Court
ruled that it was the duty of federal courts to guard,
enforce, and protect every right granted or secured
by the Constitution of the United States.
Plainly, escape from that duty is not permissible
merely because state courts also have the solemn
responsibility, equally with the federal courts ... t
Echoing Dombrowski, the Court held that where a
statute is attacked as facially repugnant to the
first amendment, an impermissible chilling effect
on those rights might result from the delay of
awaiting disposition in state courts.
17
Neither Dombrowski nor the Court's other
decisions in the area prior to the 1970 term defined
the outer limits of federal court intervention into
state criminal affairs." Until the question of the
applicability of the Dombrowski and Zwickler
doctrines to pending criminal prosecutions was
decided, the true scope of the doctrines was im-
possible of ascertainment. 19 The Supreme Court, in
A court of the United States may not grant an in-
junction to stay proceedings in a State court except
as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or
where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to pro-
tect or effectuate its judgments.
14 380 U.S. at 484 n. 2.
15389 U.S. 241 (1967). In Zwickler, the plaintiff was
an individual with a propensity towards distributing
anonymous handbills in violation of a New York penal
law forbidding the printing, distribution, etc. of un-
signed handbills. Zwickler's conviction was reversed by
the New York courts on non-constitutional grounds.
Zwickler thereupon sought federal relief in the form of a
declaratory judgment that the statute was void for
overbreadth and an injunction against future prosecu-
tion. The district court dismissed the complaint.
16 389 U.S. at 248.
17 The Court thus ruled that the district court erred
in not passing on the complaint for declaratory relief.
Id. at 252. In regard to plaintiff's claim to injunctive re-
lief, which had also been denied by the lower court, the
Court stated,
Dombrowski teaches that the questions of absten-
tion and of injunctive relief are not the same....
We squarely held that "the abstention doctrine is
inappropriate for cases such as the present one
,,here.., statutes are justifiably attacked on their
face as abridging free expression ....
Id. at 254. The Court then held that where a statute is
attacked for overbreadth in a proceeding for declarator)
relief abstention is not a relevant question and that if
the declaratory relief is granted a court need only deter-
mine whether injunctive relief is either "necessary or
appropriate." The merits of the declaratory request
were to be decided irrespective of the propriety of in-
junctive relief. Id. at 254-55.
l See generally, Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief
Against State Court Proceedings: The Signifiance of
Dombrowski, 48 TEXAS L. REv. 535 (1970).
19 Id. at 591-605.
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a series of cases,20 has now answered that question,
and in a manner designed to limit the holdings of
Dombrowski and Zwickler to their facts.
In Io;,nger v. Harris,21 plaintiff Harris was
indicted under a California statute known as the
California Criminal Syndicalism Act 22 for distri-
buting leaflets advocating a change in industrial
ownership through political action.2 3 Harris sought
to have the federal district court enjoin prosecution
of the criminal charges on the grounds that the
statute and the prosecution inhibited him from
exercising his first amendment rights. Harris was
joined in his request fok injunctive relief by three
intervenors: two members of the Progressive Labor
Party who alleged that they were inhibited in
propagating their political beliefs and a history
professor who feared he might be unable to teach
the doctrines of Karl Marx. All the plaintiffs
alleged that immediate injury would result from a
failure to enjoin the prosecution of Harris. A
three-judge federal district court held the Cali-
fornia Act facially void for vagueness and over-
breadth and enjoined the pending prosecution
against Harris.2 4 The Supreme Court on appeal
reversed, Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting.
5
The majority opinion, delivered by Mr. Justice
Black,26 quickly disposed of the intervenors for
lack of a controversy. The Court noted that none
of the intervenors had been indicted, arrested or
threatened with prosecution under the challenged
acts. The fact that the intervenors might feel
"inhibited" by the prosecution pending against
Harris was held insufficient to warrant so serious a
matter as federal injunction of a pending state
prosecutionY
20 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v.
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S.
77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson
v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401
U.S. 216 (1971).
21401 U.S. 37 (1971).
2 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400, 11401 (1970):
'Criminal syndicalism' as used in this article
means any doctrine or precept advocating, teaching
or aiding and abetting the commission of crime,
sabotage (which word is hereby defined as meaning
wilful and malicious physical damage or injury to
physical property), or unlawful acts of force and
violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a
means of accomplishing a change in industrial
ownership or control, or effecting any political
change.
23401 U.S. at 60, dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas.24 Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal.
1968).
25 401 U.S. at 58.
26 Mr. Justice Black took no part in the consideration
or decision of Dombrowski. 380 U.S. at 498.
27401 U.S. at 41-42.
As to Harris' claim for relief, the Court reversed
the district court, holding that federal courts
should not interfere in state criminal proceedings
where petitioner has an adequate remedy in the
state courts to protect his constitutional rights.
The majority opinion discussed the traditions of
"comity" between the federal government and the
states as a concept occupying "a highly important
place in our Nation's history and its future." 21
Under this tradition of "Our Federalism" the
national government, anxious as it is to protect
and vindicate federal rights and federal interests,
must find ways to do so without unduly interfering
with the legitimate activities of state govern-
ments.2 9 Only when a failure to act will cause
irreparable injury that is both great and immediate
should a federal court exercise its equitable juris-
diction and enjoin a pending state proceeding. The
Court did not define "irreparable injury" but did
say that it must be more than the cost, anxiety,
and inconvenience of defending a single criminal
prosecution.
Instead, the threat to the plaintiff's federally pro-
tected rights must be one that cannot be eliminated
by his defense against a single criminal prosecu-
tion. 30
The Court distinguished Dornbrowski on the
grounds that allegations of "bad faith" prosecu-
tion" in that case established the traditional type
of "irreparable injury" sufficient to bring federal
equitable powers into play. While the Court
recognized that some language in Dmnbrowski
could support an argument that that case author-
ized a federal court to grant equitable relief when-
ever a "facially" overbroad statute threatened the
free exercise of first amendment rights, it declared
this language to have been unnecessary to the
decision of that case.
It is undoubtedly true, as the Court stated in Dom-
browski, that '[a] criminal prosecution under a
statute regulating expression usually involves
impondeiables and contingencies that themselves
may inhibit the full exercise of First Amendment
freedoms.' 380 U.S. at 486. But this sort of 'chill-
ing effect,' as the Court called it, should not by
itself justify federal intervention.D
23 Id. at 45.
21 Id. at 44.30 Id. at 46.
31 "Bad faith" here can be defined as harassment or
repeated prosecutions by law enforcement officials with-
out any real hope of securing valid convictions. See
Maraist, supra note 18, at 585-91.32 401 U.S. at 50.
1971]
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The Court further noted that the procedures for
testing the constitutionality of a statute on its
face in the manner contemplated by Dombrowski
are at odds with the powers and duties of the
federal courts which are derived from its re-
sponsibility for resolving concrete disputes.3
The majority limited its teachings in Younger in
two ways: (1) it specifically stated that it was
expressing no views about the circumstances
necessary for federal action when no prosecution is
pending in a state court;34 and (2) because the
Court based its decision on equitable principles it
declined to decide whether the "anti-injunction"
statute 5 would in and of itself control the case.
36
In five companion cases disposed of with
Younger, the Court both reiterated and enlarged
upon the Younger holding. In Samuels v. Mackelln
the Court ruled, in seeming contradiction to its
prior decision in Zwickler v. Koota,38 that the same
equitable principles are to attach for declaratory
relief as for injunctive relief.39 The Court based its
ruling on the fact that ordinarily either injunctive
or declaratory relief would have the same result on
pending prosecutions and that therefore the same
principle barring injunctive relief should also bar
declaratory relief.4
1 Id. at 52-53.34 Id. at 41.
"See note 13 supra.
36 401 U.S. at 54.
37 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
8 See Maraist, supra note 18, at 603-05. Zwickler v.
Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967), held that district courts
were to consider requests for declaratory relief inde-
pendently of any request for injunctive relief and render
its decision on the merits irrespective of the appro-
priateness of injunctive relief, Id. at 254. Professor
Maraist discussed the Zwickler case as capable of es-
tablishing a theory that could circumvent any bars to
federal injunctions of pending prosecutions:
The Declaratory Judgments Act provides that a
federal court, after granting a declaratory judg-
ment, may give 'further necessary or proper relief'
to the litigant who prevails, and the Anti-Injunc-
tion Act excepts from its coverage stays of pending(28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1964) state proceedings when
stays are necessary to "effectuate" a judgment of
the court (28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964)).
Mariast, supra note 18, at 603 (footnotes interlineated).
Professor Maraist cited Landry v. Daley, 288 F.Supp.
189 (M.D.Ill. 1968) as an example of the theory in prac-
tice. Landry, of course, is one of the cases reversed sub
nor. Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971), in conjunc-
tion with Younger and Samuels. It is interesting to note
that Mr. Justice Black's majority opinion in Samuels
discusses the same possibility of circumventing bars to
injunctive relief in pending prosecutions as does Pro-
fessor Maraist, 400 U.S. at 72, but Mr. Justice Black
did not even mention Zwickler, a decision in which hejoined. See also note 17 supra.
39 401 U.S. at 73.
40 The Court quoted at length from Great Lakes Co.
In Boyle v. Landry41 the Court disposed of
plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief on the
grounds that none of the plaintiffs "had ever been
prosecuted, charged, or even arrested.. ."-2
under the statute that the district court had found
unconstitutional. The Court felt that the peti-
tioners were merely "speculating" 41 with respect
to statutes that might be used to harrass or
intimidate them.
In Perez v. Ledesma," Dyson v. Stein,45 and
Byrne v. Karalexis46 plaintiffs had successfully
challenged the validity of their arrest and the
seizure of their property under state obscenity
statutes. Once again the Court reversed the
decisions of the lower courts, holding that any
constitutional questions raised with regard to the
various obscenity statutes were to be adjudicated
during the course of the state criminal proceedings.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented from the major-
ity's view of the impropriety of federal intervention
in state criminal proceedings in most situations. a
justice Douglas praised the Dombrowski decision as
recognizing that we are in a period where enormous
extrajudicial sanctions are imposed on dissenters.
[Iln times of repression, when interests with power-
ful spokesmen generate symbolic pogroms against
nonconformists, the federal judiciary, charged by
Congress with special vigilance for protection of
civil rights has special responsibilities to prevent
an erosion of the individual's constitutional
rights.48
In the opinion of Justice Douglas the plaintiffs in
Younger, Boyle, and Dysone were entitled to the
v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943), a case where the Court
refused to grant declaratory relief from an allegedly
unconstitutional state tax on the grounds that since
injunctive relief would not be proper due to the ade-
quacy of state remedies neither would declaratory relief
be proper. The Court further stated that although it was
unable to find any case of its own dealing with the ap-
plication of the doctrine to cases in which the relief
sought affected state criminal prosecutions rather than
state tax collections, it could perceive no relevant dif-
ference between the two situations with respect to the
limited question of whether, in cases where the criminal
proceeding was begun prior to the federal civil suit, the
propriety of declaratory and injunctive relief should bejudged by essentially the same standards. 401 U.S. at
71-2.
41401 U.S. 77 (1971).
42 Id. at 80.
11 Id. at 81.
401 U.S. 82 (1971).
45401 U.S. 200 (1971).
46 401 U.S. 216 (1971).
4 401 U.S. at 58.4
8 Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
11 Justice Douglas concurred in Samuds, 401 U.S. at
[Vol. 52
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relief they requested under the doctrines an-
nounced in Dombrowski and Zwickler. Mr. justice
Douglas also held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an
expressly authorized exception to the "anti-
injunction" statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283,0 and thus
no bar to those who would seek to enjoin state
proceedings on the grounds of a deprivation of civil
rights under color of law.
The response to Younger in the lower courts was
immediate. Less than two weeks after the Younger
decision a district court in New Jersey dismissed a
class action by "longhaired travellers" alleging
harassment by state police.5" The court ruled, on
the authority of Younger, that those members of
the class who where the subject of pending prosecu-
tions had an adequate forum to press their claims
and that those who were not subject to prosecution
had no valid claim to federal relief to "calm their
inhibitions." Similarly, a district court in Cali-
fornia refused to interfere in obscenity cases
pending in the state courts on the grounds that
they were good faith prosecutions brought in the
hope of valid convictions.ss The lower court, in
discussing Youitger and other recent Supreme Court
decisions, exemplifies the spirit of numerous lower
federal courts which have relied on Younger to
deny plaintiffs federal intervention:
74, dissented in part in Perez, 401 U.S. at 90, and took
no part in Byrne, 401 U.S. at 220.
60 See note 13 supra.51Lewis v. Kugler, 324 F. Supp. 1220 (D.N.J. 1971).
The longhaired travellers were actually a sub-class of
"persons of highly individualized appearance," who,
because of their appearance, they alleged, were sub-jected to frequent and unreasonable stops and searches
along the highways of New Jersey by state police.
Plaintiffs further alleged such activity resulted in sev-
eral drug offense charges being brought against their
number, and that prosecution for those offenses should
be enjoined. In Lewis v. Kugler, 9 BNA Cam. L.
R1PTR. 2409 (3rd Cir. Aug. 4, 1971), the Third Circuit
reversed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' com-
plaint for future injunctive relief from the state police
but still instructed the trial court on remand to enter no
-declaratory judgment with respect to the constitution-
ality of the searches and seizures forming the bases of
pending prosecutions.
5 Veen v. Davis, 326 F. Supp. 116 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
Other cases where courts have refused to intervene
in state proceedings on the strength of Younger are
Livingston v. Garmire, 9 BNA CMan. L. REPiT. 2166
(5th Cir. May 10, 1971) (Withdrawal of earlier opinion,
437 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1971), affirming district court
declaration that Miami disorderly conduct ordinance
was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals remanded
to the district court for reconsideration in light of
Younger); Rialto Theatre Co. v. City of Wilmington,
440 F.2d 1326 (3rd Cir. 1971) (District court order, re-
quiring state officials to return motion picture film
seized in raid to plaintiffs, remanded to district court to
return parties to status quo before federal interference);
Thevis v. Moore, 440 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1971) (Re-
The Supreme Court has obviously called a halt to
the faddish trend of irritating interventions in
State action that for a while threatened to become
an avalanche of constitutional fetishism."
Despite the sweeping language of Younger and
its companions,, a number of federal courts have
exhibited a reluctance to interpret the Younger
holding too broadly. In Wheeler v. Goodman5 a
three-judge court reaffirmed their prior holding5 6 of
a North Carolina vagrancy statute as unconstitu-
tional. The Supreme Court had vacated the original
order and remanded in the light of Younger.Y On
remand the three-judge court pointed out that at
the time suit was brought there were no prosecu-
tions pending in state courts and that the plaintiffs,
fusal to enjoin enforcement of two Birmingham ordi-
nances); People v. Birmingham, 440 F.2d 1352 (5th
Cir. 1971) (Reversal of lower court injunction against
enforcement of Birmingham obscenity ordinance); Eve
Productions v. Shannon, 439 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. 1971)
(Refusal to enjoin Missouri obscenity prosecutions);
Gornto v. Thomas, 439 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1971)
(Denial of injunctive and declaratory relief from Geor-
gia obscenity statute); Fuller v. Scott, 9 BNA Cams. L.
REPR. 2288 (M.D.N.C. June 22, 1971) (Order declar-
ing North Carolina riot statute unconstitutional va-
cated because plaintiffs failed to show bad faith or
harassment); Gregory v. Gaffney, 9 BNA Cmm. L.
RLsa. 2287 (M.D. N.C. June 14, 1971) (Declaratory
judgment that state obscenity statute was facially
vague vacated because neither bad faith nor harass-
ment had been shown by plaintiffs); Pederson v.
Klinker, 9 BNA Cmu. L. REaR. 2227 (E.D. Wis. May
25, 1971) (Temporary restraining order against prosecu-
tion of topless dancers for disorderly conduct vacated);
Alga v. Crossland, 327 F. Supp. 1264 (M.D. Ala. 1971)
(Injunction against prosecution of exhibitors of "adult
movies" under state obscenity statute denied); Marseo
v. Cannon, 326 F. Supp. 1315 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (Re-
fusal to convene three-judge court to protect topless
dancers from prosecution); Consejo General De Estudi-
antes De La Universidad De Puerto Rico v. University
of Puerto Rico, 325 F. Supp. 453 (D. Puerto Rico 1971)
(Refusal to enjoin or grant declaratory relief against
enforcement of university regulations); Ascheim v.
Quinlan, 324 F. Supp. 789 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (Suit
brought to enjoin state court prosecution of various
persons arrested in courtroom melee); Lawrence v.
Lordi, 324 F. Supp 1092 (D.N.J. 1971) (Injunctive and
declaratory relief denied upon complaint against New
Jersey statute making it a crime to advocate or incite
certain crimes); Moyer v. Nelson, 324 F. Supp. 1224
(S.D. Iowa 1971) (Refusal to enjoin good faith prosecu-
tion of traffic tickets); Hendricks v. Hogan, 324 F.
Supp. 1277-(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (Refusal to convene three-
judge court to hear complaint against New York flag
desecration statute where prosecutions were pending).
4326 F. Supp. 116, 119 n. 7.
55 9 BNA Cnnr. L. REPTR. 2312 (W.D.N.C. July 1,
1971).
56 Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. (W.D.N.C.
1970).
S401 U.S. 987 (1971).
19711
"hippies" in the Charlotte, N.C. area, had proved a
case of "clear harassment" by the police.5s
The agreed upon facts show irreparable injury,
both great and immediate, to the plaintiffs by
reason of the series of unlawful raids and entries
into their place of residence without arrest warrants
and without the slightest probable cause. 9
The facts in Wheeler are much closer to those in
Dornbrowski than to Younger. There were no
prosecutions pending in the state courts and there
was a showing of "bad faith" on the part of law
enforcement officials. Thus the court in Wheeler
held that federal relief was warranted to prevent
irreparable injury to the plaintiffs. Nevertheless,
although the Wheeler decision comes within the
letter of Younger, an argument could be made that
it departs from the spirit of that case. Much
emphasis was placed by the Younger majority on
the necessity to exhaust state remedies prior to
requesting federal relief. In Wheeler, plaintiffs
could have sought injunctive relief within the
state courts, but the Wheeler court was careful not
to extend the federal exhaustion requirement this
far. The necessity of exhaustion before writ of
habeas corpus is sought in the federal courts is
analogous. 0
Similarly in Clutchette v. Procunier,6' a Cali-
fornia district court refused to apply the Younger
exhaustion requirement to quasi-criminal pro-
ceedings. In Clutchette, the' court enjoined all
prison disciplinary proceedings pending imple-
mentation of procedures by the state that will
afford prisoners the basics of due process of law.
The court held Younger to be inapplicable by
labeling the action civil:
Nothing in those decisikns would lead this court
to conclude that federal courts must abstain from
deciding civil cases equally cognizable in state
courts although not yet instituted. Such an inter-
pretation would reintroduce the exhaustion doc-
trine into civil rights actions, a procedure certainly
not intended by the Supreme Court in the Younger
decisions.n
58 See also Hull v. Petrillo, 439 F.2d 1184 (2d Cir.
1971), where the court of appeals reversed the district
court's dismissal of complaint alleging bad faith har-
rassment under city ordinance requiring license to sell
newspapers on street.59 9 BNA Cnms. L. REpra. at 2312.
10 EP tarte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
619 BNA CRin. L. RExra. 2291 (N.D. Cal. June 21,
1971).
12 Id. See also McCue v. Racine, 9 BNA Cnms. L.
REPTR. 2451 (E.D. Wis. July 28, 1971), where a dis-
trict court held that Younger did not bar an injunction
Notwithstanding the district court's simple
assertion that the action was civil, it is difficult to
imagine a more disruptive influence on fedcral-
state relations than an injunction against a state's
prison disciplinary proceedings. If ever there was a
case where the interests of "comity" were at stake
and where a civil action involved criminal pro-
ceedings this was it. Yet the Clutchette court chose
not to trust the adjudication of prisoners' constitu-
tional rights to the state courts.
Where prosecution of plaintiff was begun in good
faith but there was no possibility of immediate
relief in the state courts, another district court
also found Younger to be inapplicable. In Sweeten
v. Sneddon" the plaintiff was facing prosecution in
the state courts for a misdemeanor. Because the
pending charge was a misdemeanor, the state
court refused to appoint an attorney for Sweeten
even though he was indigent. Sweeten, however,
was on parole from a prior felony conviction, and if
convicted for the misdemeanor faced imprisonment
not only for the misdemeanor but a revocation of
his parole. The district court enjoined the state
court from prosecuting Sweeten without an
attorney. The court, in light of Younger, found
that Sweeten was in great and immediate danger of
irreparable injury-namely trial without benefit
of counsel. The district court held that Sweeten
was entitled to counsel at trial, especially in view of
the situation of his parole, and that:
the threat to plaintiff's constitutionally protected
rights is one that cannot be eliminated by his de-
fense to the misdemeanor action, since the city
court has already denied the right he claims."
The court also took into consideration the fact that
decisions of the Supreme Court of Utah were
contrary .to plaintiff's claim to an attorney and for
that reason he stood little hope of relief in the
state courts. 65
against prosecution of nude and semi-nude "go-go"
dancers under city ordinances, which prosecutions are
civil actions under the laws of Wisconsin.
61324 F. Supp. 1094 (D. Utah 1971).
6Id. at 1104.
"Id. at 199. One further distinction between
Younger and Sweeten is that in the latter case the court
was not actually seeking to enjoin prosecution of the
plaintiff but only to prevent prosecution while he had
no attorney.
Sweeten, while giving regard to the unavailability of
relief in the state courts, which it seems the court in
Wheeler neglected to do, raises the question of whether
the standards for enjoining a prosecution because of
procedural failures should be less strict than the stand-
ards required to enjoin on grounds of substance. Perez
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Yet another interesting question is presented by
Taylor v. City of Selna.65 In that case a district
court in Alabama enjoined a pending prosecution
on the grounds that the prosecutions brought
against plaintiffs were brought in bad faith in
order to harass and prevent plaintiffs from partici-
pating in a local political campaign. On the grounds
of plaintiffs' danger of irreparable injury, the
court enjoined their prosecution in the state courts.
The difficulty with the facts of this case is that the
election which plaintiffs missed because of state
court prosecution was held in 1966, and the
prosecution enjoined is actually a trial de novo
from an appeal from a prior trial and conviction.
Thus, the question presented by this case is the
time sequence of irreparable injury that must exist
in order for a federal court to intervene. While
plaintiffs may have had a valid claim for injunctive
relief in 1966 (so that they would not miss the
election) when the election passed so did the
danger of irreparable injury, and once again the
prosecution became one that could run its course in
the state courts without further danger of ir-
reparable injury. The district court, however, took
a different, if not completely explained, view of the
situation.
While the election has long since been held, the
prosecution of House and Carmichael remains
unchanged and accordingly the defendants will be
enjoined from prosecuting plaintiffs ....
The district court in Taylor seems to have
accepted the view that if at any point in a criminal
proceeding a defendant stands in danger of great
and immediate irreparable injury, and therefore
has a valid claim to federal relief, those defendants
may claim their relief even after the injury has
occurred or disappeared. A better reasoned view,
in the light of the respect due to state proceedings
under Younger, would be that since federal courts
may interfere only to prevent irreparable injury,
they should not interfere when they cannot prevent
said injury.'
would seem to militate against such a reduction in
standards except where, as the court in Sweeten found,
there exists little or no chance of plaintiff's vindication
in the state courts and as a result plaintiff will suffer
great and immediate irreparable injury.
" 327 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
67 Id. at 1193.
E3 Another example of federal intervention into a
state civil matter is to be found in Board of Education
v. Shelton, 9 BNA C=. L. RarPuT. 2191 (N.D. Miss.
May 17, 1971). In that case a federal district court en-
joined enforcement of a state court's injunction which
would unconstitutionally limit demonstrations in and
CONCLUSION
There can be little doubt that the Supreme Court
in Younger and its companicn cases 'ought tc
severely limit the authority of the federal courts to
intervene in state criminal proceedings. While this
limitation is, no doubt, in part due to the backlog
of cases now docketed on federal court calendars,O
it is largely founded on a desire by the Court to
re-establish state courts, as well as the federal
courts, as protectors of the United States Consti-
tution. Only in those situations where a plaintiff
can show that great and immediate injury will
result from a refusal by the federal court to inter-
vene may a federal court exercise its equitable
powers. The Court in Younger specifically avoided
basing its decision on the anti-injunction statute,
28 U.S.C. § 2283.70 Whatever the Court's motive in
doing so, the result is to allow the lower federal
around a local school. The Court held that the suit
brought in the federal court was in actuality an attack
on a civil proceeding, the state court's injunction. This
fact, and the great and immediate irreparable injury to
constitutional rights resulting from the state court's
order, justified the federal intervention requested in the
eyes of the court. There was, in that case, the additional
fact that the federal courts had previously entered
orders on the very subject of restraints on protest
around that very school and, therefore, the state court's
injunction was actually an interference with the federal
court's jurisdiction of the matter Id. at 2192. The court
discussed the state court's interference with the federal
court's order as an exception under 28 U.S.C. § 2283,
the anti-injunction statute (see note 13 supra for text of
statute).
Another case, while not directly on point, that raises
some interesting questions in federal-state court rela-
tions in criminal matters, is Bastida v. Braniff, 9 BNA
CRam. L. Rarm. 2279 (5th Cir. June 7, 1971). That case
was a proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus rather than
an action for injunction. The court of appeals found
that threats by the state court judge and prosecutor to
double petitioner's sentence should he be successful in
the federal courts and reconvicted in the state courtsjustified the district court, that had granted the writ,
in retaining jurisdiction of the case until any new trial
and sentencing has been completed. The ill feelings that
can result from federal intervention in state proceedings
can be vividly seen in this case. An additional reason for
the court of appeals' order that the district court re-
tain jurisdiction of the new trial was that,
... Judge Braniff and District Attorney Wimberly
have both expressed extreme hostility toward this
court for granting relief to petitioner ....
Id. It was exactly this sort of unseemly friction between
state and federal courts that the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Younger seeks to avoid; yet, in situations
where a state court has acted in disregard of a defend-
ant's civil rights, as in the Bastida case, i+ would be
even more unseemly for an individual's rights to be
sacrificed in order to maintain a superficial appearance
of agreement between state and federal courts.
C9 See Burger, State of the Federal Judiciary (Aug. 10,
1970), 90 S. Ct. 2381 (1970).
70 401 U.S. at 54, See note 13 supra for text of statute.
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